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When Does Inflation Hurt Economic Growth? 
  Different Nonlinearities for Different Economies 
 
Introduction 
  Although few economists now recommend that governments should try to 
engineer inflation, there is still no consensus as to when the benefits of anti-inflationary 
programs are likely to exceed the short-run costs.  Many argue that it is not worth the 
transitional costs to bring down inflation rates in industrial countries from 2% or 3% to 
zero, especially when the upward bias of many price indices is taken into account.  And 
in the case of developing economies it has not been uncommon for economists to judge 
inflation rates of from 20% to as much as 40% as being satisfactory.  Negative effects of 
inflation on growth may well only begin to kick in after some threshold has been 
breached.  But there has been little systematic research on where these thresholds lie and 
the judgments offered have varied widely.
1 
  It is clearly important for policymakers to have a better-informed idea of where 
such inflation thresholds may lie for different economies.  Sarel (1996) finds that the 
failure to take such thresholds into account can lead to substantial downward bias in 
estimates of the growth costs of inflation rates above the threshold.  But, as with other 
studies such as Fischer (1993) and Barro (1996), Sarel groups together industrial and 
developing countries.  Given that recent research has demonstrated that the size of the 
growth-depressing effects of inflation differ substantially between industrial and 
developing countries,
2 it seems important to allow the position of thresholds to differ also 
across the two groups of countries.    2  
  Another key issue is that, once the initial threshold has been passed, the marginal 
growth costs cannot necessarily be assumed to remain constant as the rate of inflation 
increases.  Even if the total costs of inflation continue to climb as the inflation rate 
increases, after some point the marginal effects will surely begin to decline.  Thus, for 
example, going from an inflation rate of 30% to 40% seems likely to generate more 
additional uncertainty than going from 130% to 140%.  Fischer (1993) finds support for 
this view for industrial and developing country data.  Using break points of 15% and 
40%, Fischer finds the coefficients on inflation rates above 40% to be substantially lower 
than for those between 15% and 40%.
3  Fischer’s thresholds are, however, picked by 
judgment rather than by empirical search.  Meanwhile Sarel’s search procedure, although 
allowing the initial threshold (suggested to be at 8% for his combined sample of 
industrial and developing countries) to be determined by the data, takes no account of the 
additional nonlinearity suggested by Fischer (1993). 
  In this paper, we follow a variant of Sarel’s econometric procedure, but consider 
separately the data for industrial and developing countries and also allow for multiple 
thresholds.  We isolate an 8% threshold for the industrial countries that corresponds to 
Sarel’s findings for his combined sample, but for developing countries we identify an 
initial 3% threshold.  Up to the 8% threshold for the industrial countries, the effects of 
rising rates of inflation are statistically insignificant but predominantly negative.   
However, for the developing countries, inflation has positive, significant, and sizable 
effects until the 3% threshold is reached.  While inflation has negative effects after this 
point, developing countries clearly feature the decreasing marginal costs of inflation 
suggested by Fischer.  Using multiple knot splines, we identify a second break at around   3  
50%, with the coefficient for the marginal growth costs of inflation dropping by nearly 
three-quarters above this break.  We also find some weaker evidence of a third break at 
around the 100% level, with the coefficient falling again by a substantial amount. 
 
Assessing the Nonlinear Effects of Inflation on Growth 
  Our reduced-form model combines the effects of inflation and the first-period 
change in inflation with a wide range of potentially relevant determinants of growth that 
have been frequently used in the literature.  The first-period change in inflation is 
included to pick up possible short-run Phillips curve effects.  Other control variables -- 
previous period real GDP per capita, population growth, government expenditure, the 
black-market exchange rate premium and the terms of trade -- are included to avoid 
omitted variable bias.
4  The following equation is estimated over annual time-series data 
for 21 industrial and 51 developing countries from 1967 to 1992: 
 y  =  cnst  +  β 1inf + β 2(inf - inf1 )*break1 + β 3(inf - inf2)*break2 +  
   β 4(inf - inf3)*break3 + β 4∆ inf + β 5initialGDP + β 6pop + β 7gov +  
   β 8blmkt + β 9tot + ε  
where: 
y    =  growth rate of real GDP per capita 
cnst   =  constant  term 
inf    =  inflation rate  
inf1     =  inflation rate where the first structural break occurs 
inf2    =  inflation rate where the second structural break occurs 
inf3    =  inflation rate where the third structural break occurs 
break1   =  1 if inf > inf1 , 0 otherwise 
break2   =  1 if inf > inf2, 0 otherwise 
break3   =  1 if inf > inf3, 0 otherwise 
∆ inf    =  first difference of the inflation rate 
initialGDP  =  log of previous period real GDP per capita  
pop    =  population growth    4  
gov    =  ratio of real government expenditure to real GDP 
blmkt    =  log (1 + ratio of black-market exchange rate to official exchange  
   rate) 
tot    =  percentage change in the terms of trade 
ε    = error  term 
 
  Our basic search procedure allows for up to three breaks.  We define three 
variables -- (inf - inf1 )*break 1, (inf - inf2)*break 2 and (inf – inf3)*break 3 -- to capture 
nonlinear effects of inflation on growth.  The spline function with x breaks has x+1 line 
segments: When the inflation rate is below inf1 , the (inf - inf1 )*break1, (inf - 
inf2)*break2, and (inf - inf3)*break3 variables are all equal to zero and the effect of 
inflation is estimated by the coefficient on inf: (β 1). When the inflation rate is at higher 
levels, the coefficient on inflation is the sum of β  coefficients.   In order to locate the 
structural breaks we first allow for one break by varying the inflation rate from a low 
level to a high level.  For the industrial countries the initial range is set from zero to 29%.  
With the developing countries a wider range of zero to 150% is used because of the much 
higher inflation rates observed in this group.  Once we get approximate ranges for inf1 , 
inf2, and inf3, we then iterate across all combinations of inf1 , inf2, and inf3 until we get a 
combination for which the R
2 is maximized.  While three breaks are found for the 
developing countries, the industrial countries evince only two breaks, however.  In this 
latter case the (inf - inf3)*break3 variable is set equal to zero throughout. 
 
Results for the Industrial Countries 
  Using the generalized least squares (GLS) estimator with fixed effects, Figure 1 
shows how the R
2 values for the industrial countries vary as progressively higher inflation 
rate observations are added to the sample.  These R
2s reflect repeated re-estimations of   5  
the basic equation without structural break terms.  The R
2 reaches its maximum point 
when the inflation rate is at 8%, and starts to fall when the inflation rate passes the 8% 
threshold level.  The R
2 rises again when the inflation rate passes the 21% level and 
reaches its maximum when the inflation rate is at 24%.  Once the inflation rate passes the 
24% level, the R
2 starts to fall.  After searching over different combinations of inf1 and 
inf2, we find that a combination of 8% and 25% inflation rates yields the highest R
2.  
Results from t-tests indicate that these two structural breaks are statistically significant at 
the 1% and 5% level, respectively.  As there is no evidence of a third break in this case, 
no inf3 term appears in the regression results for the industrial countries. 
  Table 1 presents the panel estimates with fixed effects for the industrial 
countries.
5  The spline function results show that the relationship between inflation and 
growth is nonlinear.  Based on our findings, when inflation is below the 8% threshold 
level, the estimated effect of inflation on growth is negative (-0.065) but statistically 
insignificant.  However, when the inflation rate is above the threshold level (8%) but 
below the second structural break (25%), the coefficient on inflation is negative (-0.310) 
and significant at the 1% level.  The estimated coefficient indicates that an increase in the 
inflation rate of 1% would lower the growth rate by about 0.3%.  When the inflation rate 
exceeds 25%, the estimated coefficient on inflation is negative and significant with the 
even higher magnitude of -1.713.  These results also suggest that the marginal costs of 
inflation for the industrial countries are rising as the inflation rate increases. 
  When the equation is re-estimated without the threshold effects, panel results for 
the linear model (misleadingly) indicate that a 1% increase in inflation would reduce 
growth by 0.21%, a relatively small number when compared to the spline function results   6  
for an inflation rate between 8% and 25%.  This suggests that not taking structural breaks 
into account will bias downward the estimated effects of inflation on growth by a factor 
of about 1.5. 
  Our empirical results also evidence a short-run Phillips curve trade-off for the 
industrial countries.  The estimated coefficient on the first difference of inflation is 
positive and significant, suggesting that a 1% increase in inflation would increase growth 
by 0.15% in the short run.  The coefficient on previous period real GDP per capita, 
population growth, and the ratio of real government expenditure to real GDP variables all 
have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
Results for the Developing Countries 
 The  R
2 results shown in Figure 2 suggest three points of inflection at the inflation 
rates of 2.5%, 56%, and 89%.  After iterating across different combinations of inf1 , inf2, 
and inf3, a combination of the inflation rates of 3%, 50%, and 102% is found to yield the 
highest R
2.  The structural breaks at the inflation rates of 3% and 50% are both 
statistically significant at the 1% level.  The break at 102% is not significant, however.  
As shown in the developing country panel estimation results in Table 2 (column 1), when 
the inflation rate is below the 3% threshold level, the coefficient on inflation is positive 
and highly significant (0.361).
6  These findings suggest that, at such low rates, higher 
inflation increases economic growth.  However, when the inflation rate is between 3% 
and 50%, the coefficient of inflation is negative and significant at the 1% level.  The 
estimated effect indicates that a 1% increase in inflation would lower growth by 0.083%.  
When inflation is between 50% and 102%, the estimated effect of inflation on growth is   7  
negative (-0.023) but not significant.
7  The effect of inflation on growth becomes 
negative (-0.007) and significant at the 5% level when the inflation rate exceeds 102%.  
In contrast to the industrial countries, the results from developing countries suggest that 
the marginal costs of inflation are declining as the inflation rate rises.
8 
  By comparison, linear estimation without any allowance for structural breaks 
would have us believe that an increase in the inflation rate of 1% reduces the growth rate 
by only 0.013%.  Note that this coefficient value is well below the value implied by the 
spline function when the inflation rate is between 3% and 50%.  As with the results from 
the industrial countries, when structural breaks are ignored the estimated effects of 
inflation on growth are biased downward substantially -- in this case by a factor of more 
than five. 
  There is no evidence of a short-run effect of inflation for developing countries.  
Otherwise, the coefficients on the control variables all have the expected signs and are 
significant at least at the 10% level -- except for the coefficient on population growth that 
is significant at the 11% level. 
  
Conclusions 
This paper’s empirical results support the view that the effect of inflation on 
growth is nonlinear and that there is indeed a threshold at which inflation starts to have a 
negative impact on growth.  While there is a nonlinear relationship between inflation and 
growth in both industrial and developing countries, not only do the critical inflation rates 
differ but also the effects of inflation on growth are quite different between the two 
groups of countries.  Thus, the results from studies that estimate the nonlinear   8  
relationship between inflation and growth by pooling industrial and developing countries 
together should be treated with caution.  Furthermore, our results yield further evidence 
that a failure to take account of nonlinearity causes a substantial downward bias in the 
estimated negative effects of inflation on growth. 
While a number of studies find negative inflation-growth correlations using a 
linear model, our analysis indicates that inflation affects growth differently depending 
upon the range of the inflation rate and the type of economy under consideration.  These 
findings suggest the importance of further theoretical and empirical research to better 
understand the causes of these differences and to investigate whether it will prove useful 
to make finer distinctions than just industrial versus developing countries.
9  9  
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exchange rate to the official exchange rate 
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Percentage change in the terms of trade defined as the log of export prices minus the 
log of import prices 
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First difference of inflation 
 
0.15 
        (4.13) 
Log of previous period real GDP 
per capita 
-0.029 




        (4.28) 
Ratio of real government 
expenditure to real GDP 
-0.0033 
       (4.01) 
Inflation: below 8% 
 
-0.065 
        (1.38) 
Inflation: between 8% and 25% 
 
-0.310 
        (8.17) 
Inflation: above 25% 
 
-1.713 
        (2.93) 
 
Inflation: without structural 
breaks 
-0.214 






Notes:   R
2  = 0.40; number of observations = 583; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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First difference of inflation 
 
-0.00001 
     (0.05) 
0.0000008 
   (0.04) 
Log of previous period real GDP 
per capita 
0.018 
      (2.36) 
0.018 




        (1.62) 
-0.16 
        (1.54) 
Ratio of real government 
expenditure to real GDP 
-0.0019 
       (3.96) 
      -0.0019 
      (3.97) 
Log (1 + black-market exchange 
rate premium 
-0.020 
        (2.70) 
      -0.032 
      (3.82) 
Percentage change in terms of 
trade 
0.031 
       (3.79) 
0.032 
       (3.82) 
Inflation: below 3% 
 
0.361 
      (2.65) 
6.167 
       (4.26) 
Inflation: between 3% and 50% 
 
-0.083 
        (5.68) 
-0.083 
        (5.69) 
Inflation: between 50% and 102% 
 
-0.023 
       (1.43) 
-0.022 
        (1.36) 
Inflation: above 102% 
 
-0.007 
        (2.26) 
-0.006 
        (1.81) 
 
Inflation: without structural 
breaks 
-0.013 
        (5.23) 
-0.013 







2 = 0.32; number of observations = 1181. 
 
  The structural breaks at 3% and 50% inflation are both statistically significant at the 1% level.  
However, the third suggested break at 102% inflation is statistically insignificant.  
 
In the last column, the initial threshold is reset to 1%. 
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1 Representative studies include Fischer (1993), Barro (1996), Motley (1996), Sarel (1996),  Christoffersen 
and Doyle (1998), Ghosh and Phillips (1998) and Kalra and Sløk (1999). 
 
2 See, for example, Burdekin et al. (1994; 1995) and Kim and Willett (2000). 
 
3 While Barro (1996), using the same breakpoints as Fischer (1993), finds that the differences in 
coefficients are not statistically significant, the coefficient pattern (–0.16, -0.37 and –0.23) remains 
suggestive of the same type of nonlinearity noted by Fischer. 
 
4 For industrial countries, we include only the first difference of inflation, previous period real GDP per 
capita, population growth, and government expenditure as our control variables since the other control 
variables are not statistically significant. 
 
5 Re-estimating the equation for the industrial countries using the pooled GLS method yields results similar 
to those estimated using the panel with fixed effects.  The R
2s suggests that structural breaks occur when 
inflation is at 8% and 24%.  Below 8%, the coefficient on inflation is negative (-0.045) but insignificant.  
The estimated effect of inflation on growth is negative and statistically significant (-0.297) when inflation 
is between 8% and 24%.  Above 24%, the effect of inflation is negative with even higher magnitude (-
1.081).  These results also suggest that the marginal costs of inflation are rising as inflation rate increases.  
These and other sensitivity tests reported are available from the authors upon request.  
 
6 The results of estimating the equation using the panel method with period and region dummies are quite 
similar to those estimated by the basic panel method with fixed effects.  In this case structural breaks are 
identified at the inflation rates of 3%, 50%, and 102%.  Below 3%, the effect of inflation on growth is 
positive (0.364) and significant at the 1% level.  When the inflation rate is between 3% and 50%, the 
estimated effect of inflation is negative (-0.058) and significant at the 1% level.  The coefficients of 
inflation on growth are negative but statistically insignificant with the magnitudes of -0.017 and -0.004, 
respectively when inflation is between 50% and 102% and above 102%.  These results again clearly show 
the marginal costs of inflation to decline as the inflation rate rises. 
 
7 The p-value is 0.15. 
 
8 Whereas Sarel (1996) actually uses the log rather than the level of inflation in his regressions, further 
testing showed this functional form to have little effect on our results for the industrial countries.  It did 
increase our estimate of the first threshold for developing countries from 3% to 10%, however (see 
Burdekin et al., 2000).  Of course one cannot take logs of negative numbers so Sarel replaced all negative 
inflation rates with 0.1.  To check the importance of purging negative rates of inflation from the sample, we 
also ran a regression in levels for the developing countries with all negative inflation rates deleted.  As 
reported in Table 2 (column 2), this had almost no effect except for the first threshold where the effects are 
substantial.  The threshold falls to one percent and, while the coefficient remains positive and significant, it 
rises dramatically from 0.36 to an implausible high 6.17.  This demonstrates the importance of avoiding 
negative rates of inflation and confirms that effects of actual deflation are quite distinct from the effects of 
near zero, but positive, inflation rates. 
 
9 Burdekin et al. (1994) suggest that the substantially higher estimates of the costs of inflation for industrial 
countries may result from their greater use of financial markets.  They hypothesize that this leads to higher 
per capita income in the industrial countries, but also makes them more sensitive to the adverse effects of 
inflation. 